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Over the course of the last 17 years the author has researched, dived, surveyed 
and identified some 100 submarine wrecks around the UK. His 2014 book 
examines the 63 known U-boat wrecks in the English Channel, of which 32 
were sunk during World War I. Detailed analysis of each case revealed that 
the list of U-boat losses published by the Antisubmarine Division (ASD) of 
the Admiralty in 1919 (the 1919 List) was only 48 per cent accurate. Of the 
wrecks not mentioned in the 1919 List, (UC-79) is the most startling case, 
primarily because ASD knew where it was during wartime but hid its true fate 
when it compiled the 1919 List in order to preserve its own reputation. This 
paper examines why this happened and what its broader implications are for 
archaeologists, historians and heritage managers.
Figure 1. Map showing the location of the wreck of (UC79) in the Dover Barrage 
and the related oil patch and 1918 diving site. Nearby wrecks and incidents are 
also shown © Innes McCartney.
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11 In 2000, on a tip-off from a local fisherman, French divers found the wreck 
of a U-boat off Gris-Nez in the Dover Straits (Figure 1). During subsequent 
dives it was found to be of the UCII-Class of minelaying U-boat,mined in the 
Dover Barrage (a large minefield laid in 1917-18 to close the Dover Straits 
to U-boats). Both of its propellers were scraped in an attempt to reveal the 
identity of the wreck. This methodology can be 100 per cent successful, leading 
to an unassailable identification of a U-boat wreck, if both propellors match 
and the result coalesces with supportive historical evidence. Not unusually, in 
this case the propellors did not match, leading to an inconclusive result. The 
port side propellor was stamped ‘UC79’ and starboard side ‘UC77’, raising the 
possibility that one, or even both propellors had been substituted during the 
U-boat’s operational life. 
In consultation with the divers, the historian Michael Lowrey deduced that 
wreck must be (UC-79), which left for its last patrol on 20 March 1918. Figure 
1 shows that the location of the wreck is very close to where a patch of oil was 
first spotted by airship on 12 June 1918. Since UC-77 was operational until 
July 1918 it seems that it can be discounted as a candidate for this wreck site. 
This means that UC-79 remains by far the best probable identity for the wreck. 
But it is yet to be fully confirmed, with UC-78 also being a potential candidate, 
unaccounted for as a wreck elsewhere. For this reason the wreck’s identity is 
cited in parentheses, a probable but unconfirmed identification.
According to ASD’s 1919 List, UC-79 was confidently attributed with being 
destroyed by the British submarine HMS E-45 on 19 October 1917 in the 
southern North Sea. However, an examination of the details of the attack 
reveals that all that was witnessed was in fact a ‘great disturbance of water’, 
with no supportive physical evidence seen. This would appear then, to be a 
somewhat dubious attribution, if it was not for the fact that ASD thought it 
knew from radio intelligence that UC-79 was in the same area as HMS E-45 
at the time of its attack. So seemingly confident was ASD about the success of 
this attack that UC-79 was removed from its daily plot and listed as sunk, never 
to be reinstated. We now know that in fact it was U-53 that was attacked (ASD 
had most probably confused its callsign with that of UC-79) and it survived to 
report the incident in its war diary.
Of course ASD could not have known this, but it was not too long before the 
inconvenient truth that UC-79 was still operational began to emerge. The first 
signs must have come from the Admiralty’s cryptographic branch, Room 40, 
whose own history sheet for UC-79 shows that by February 1918 it knew that 
the U-boat was still operational. Although it may have been easy for ASD 
to ignore the views of a few intelligence officers, more bothersome was the 
discovery of the wreck of (UC-79) by Admiralty divers on 7 August 1918.  
12 Figure 2 shows the telegram sent by Commander Damant of the Admiralty 
Salvage Section, who was detailed to work for the Naval Intelligence Division 
during the summer of 1918, to find U-boat wrecks from which to gather 
intelligence. It describes the condition and state of the wreck and this matches 
well with the position of the wreck found in 2000 (Figure 1). The author 
surveyed the wreck site in the 
summer of 2014; the results 
are shown in Figure 3, the 
wreck is broken in half as 
Damant described. The 
forward section is blown 
off and lies on its port side, 
the stern section is upright. 
The two halves are almost 
touching on the starboard 
side. The key features on 
site are labelled as follows. 
Image A shows that the 
forward section is blown off 
at the point where it bisects 
mine chute six. All the mine 
chutes are in fact empty. The 
U-boat’s stern portion points 
north, suggesting the U-boat 
was destroyed in the Dover 
minefield while heading back 
to Flanders at the end of its 
patrol. Image B shows one of the two external forward torpedo tubes. Both 
are present on the wreck site, with doors sealed shut. Image C shows the view 
into the stern section which would have confronted Damant’s divers in 1918. 
It shows the underneath of the pressure hull folded upwards by the mine blast, 
creating only a tiny aperture through which no diver in 1918 could have safely 
entered the wreck. It clearly shows the wreck struck a mine underneath chute 
six. Image D shows the extreme bow of the wreck showing the angle of lean of 
the forward section. Image E shows the forward portion of the conning tower 
revealing the steering pillar for the bridge helm to still be in place. Image F 
shows a view of the conning tower seen from above. The hatch is opened, as 
described in Damant’s telegram. Image G shows the shut engine hatch. All 
are shut except the conning tower hatch seen in Image F. Image H shows the 
starboard side propellor. Both are still present and still clear of the seabed.
The presence of this wreck caused a problem for ASD in the fact that no 
witnessed incident could be found to plausibly explain its presence in the 
Figure 2. Commander Damant’s telegram describing 
the discovery of (UC79) in August 1918. The 
attribution to “UC12” is most probably a typographic 
error, with Damant meaning that a UCII type had 
been found. © Crown Copyright
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Figure 3. Site map of the wreck of (UC79) as surveyed by the author on 20 
July 2014 © Innes McCartney
14 minefield before the 12 June sighting of oil. In an attempt to date when the 
U-boat was sunk, Damant’s divers recovered a piece of “tin” sheet from the 
wreck and it was sent to the British Museum so that the barnacle growth 
could be dated (Figure 4). This is certainly an early case of such a forensic 
approach being used in wartime. The results of the museum’s analysis led to the 
conclusion that the U-boat was sunk in March to May 1918. The problem was 
that this conflicted with ASD’s view that it had already successfully accounted 
for all of the UCII minelayers which had been lost during this period and 
awkwardly, none fitted this scenario. 
ASD’s weakest assertion was seemingly that of UC-78, considered mined in 
the Dover Barrage. In this instance its supposed destruction had not yielded 
survivors or other identifying material, but the witnessed mine explosion made 
for a very good case. Parenthetically, in 1982 a wreck was found by divers at the 
position given in 1918 for the loss of UC-78 and it ironically turned out to be 
UB-78, leaving UC-78 without a verified recorded fate to this day, making it a 
theoretical albeit unlikely candidate for this wreck. Of course ASD knew that 
Room 40 had shown that UC-79 had survived its encounter with HMS E-45 
the previous October and was still operational.
Ultimately then, ASD must have concluded that in all likelihood the wreck 
found on 7 August 1918 had to be UC-79, confirming Room 40’s suspicions 
that the U-boat was still operational. Since February 1918 the intelligence 
appreciation as to UC-79’s operational status had been strengthened by U-boat 
survivor interrogations which showed that UC-79 was last seen around April 
1918. Unbeknownst to ASD UC-79 had actually departed on its final patrol on 
Figure 4. How ASD’s attribution for the loss of UC79 unravelled (left to right): 
Commander Damant, whose divers located the wreck of (UC79) off Gris Nez in 
August 1918 (R. H. Davis), the barnacled tin sheet which dated the time of loss 
of UC79 (National Archives) and Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander William F. Clarke 
RNVR, the Room 40 intelligence officer who revealed how ASD manipulated the 
historic record to its advantage © Crown Copyright
15 20 March. It seems therefore that ASD could only realistically have concluded 
that the wreck was UC-79. 
The problem was that it had already listed it as destroyed. So how could it now 
be resurrected?
The answer is that it simply was not. Of all of the U-boat wrecks known to have 
been surveyed by Salvage Section divers, this case is the only one in which the 
actual physical presence of a destroyed U-boat was simply (and conveniently) 
ignored when ASD compiled the 1919 List. Therein the fate of UC-79 is 
described as being sunk by HMS E45 in October 1917, even though ASD 
clearly knew that this was not true.
Such a bold assertion about how official Admiralty texts were compiled, made by 
an archaeologist, would seem to require some alternative form of substantiation, 
ideally from within the Admiralty. It was found in the unpublished papers of W. 
F. Clarke, Room 40 Intelligence Officer and latterly Deputy Head of the Naval 
Section at Bletchley Park in WW2 (Figure 4) who wrote in his unpublished 
memoirs that: 
The Anti Submarine Division ... had frequently to boost their own efforts, insisted 
on the success of many attacks that we in Room 40 knew to have been abortive and 
many officers had received decorations in consequence; when these very gallant men 
put in their claims for prize bounty, it was my none too pleasant task to turn down 
their claims.
ASD, constituted in December 1916 to combat the growing U-boat menace, 
seems to have been as interested in maintaining its reputation as in compiling 
an accurate and impartial record of U-boat losses. This is most probably the 
explanation for how such an obviously inaccurate attribution of a U-boat 
loss passed into the 1919 List and thence into published history. The obvious 
confusion with U53’s callsign was uncovered by the historian Arno Spindler in 
the 1930’s, and left UC-79 without a recorded fate until the wreck was located 
in 2000. The question remains though, how many other cases, similar to this 
still lie in the historical lists of U-boat losses in WW1 waiting to be uncovered 
as more U-boat wrecks are identified in the future? And moreover how does 
this affect the lists of the thousands of ships sunk by U-boats in WW1?
The author’s latest research published this year has uncovered other cases which 
can also quite clearly be interpreted in a similar manner. Alongside them are 
an innumerable accompaniment of obvious mistakes and oversights which do 
much to support the historian Arthur Marder’s assertion that the lack of a Naval 
Staff College at this time in Britain’s history produced ‘merely a nondescript 
collection of officers ... as ignorant of the principles of staff work as they were 
16 of strategy and operations.’ Parenthetically it took recreational divers nearly a 
century to show that there is more than a grain of truth in those words.
Ultimately then, where does this leave the heritage manager tasked under 
Article 22 of the Convention to inventory the underwater cultural heritage in 
their portion of the seas? It would seem that in the case of U-boats and therefore 
also among an unknown number of their thousands of victims, the original 
historical texts should be treated with caution. Alongside this realisation is the 
fact that many types of shipwrecks can be difficult to identify. 
In both instances, a system to differentiate the verified identity of a wreck 
from a theoretical identification may prove useful. The author has devised the 
bracketing system in use in this paper and his other published works to function 
in this way. Aside from cases where known shipwrecks very obviously match 
the historical texts, there will be others that are not so easily resolved. In those 
cases it may be better to trust what emerges from the archaeological record of 
surveyed wreck sites, for it would appear shipwrecks have a lesser propensity 
to lie.
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